A good article on Musharraf in Wall Street Journal.
He truly is a Hamlet
============
Hamlet of the Indus
Supporting Musharraf is America's worst option in Pakistan--except all the others.
BY RALPH PETERS
Sunday, January 19, 2003 12:01 a.m. EST
Whenever a voice on the airwaves generalizes about Pakistan, I want to ask, "Which Pakistan do you mean?" Beyond the facade of a flag and customs officers at major airports, there is no integral, unified state behind the name. Does the pundit mean the feudal territories east of the Indus river, which resemble 15th-century England with electricity? Or the tribal lands to the west, where the blood feuds and clan rule of medieval Scotland are supercharged by religious ferocity?
Does the Pentagon spokesperson mean the megacity of Karachi, which the government cannot rule firmly, or the frontier settlements where Islamabad does not even pretend to rule, deferring to tribal elders? Mughal Pakistan yearning for the "liberation" of Kashmir, or Pathan Pakistan dreaming of a Pukhtunistan between Kabul and Peshawar? Mohajir or Baluch Pakistan? Or Islamic Pakistan, blaming unbelievers for its self-inflicted failures?
Today's Pakistan is a military pretending its sponsor is a functioning state. The government shows little sense of responsibility for the welfare of the man on the street or the woman in the field. Pakistani identity succumbs when tribal, family, ethnic or regional rivalries come into play. The adjective lawless often is used to describe the vast Northwest Frontier Province adjoining Afghanistan. Yet that territory may be the strictest rule-of-law portion of the country--although the law is not one of ratified constitutions, but of Pukhtunwali, of the tribe, based upon religion and cultural traditions immune to modernity. Any foreign businessman can attest that the "lawless" parts of Pakistan are those most evidently under control of the government.
The contradictions compound. As a firm believer in democracy and the rule of law, I nonetheless recognize that military government is the best, if feeble, hope for keeping Pakistan together and making any progress at all. Even the most nationalistic Pakistanis will tell you that the civilian politicians pandered to cancerous extremists and ignored the law whenever they could not exploit it to family advantage.
Which leaves us with Pervez Musharraf, a Hamlet in khaki, as Pakistan's head of state.
Gen. Musharraf is, without question, a patriot. Those who know him describe him as a dutiful soldier, physically brave, conscientious and honest by local standards--but a man of limited vision. And that vision focuses obsessively on the reunification of Kashmir. Since the events of 9/11 returned America's attentions to Pakistan, Gen. Musharraf consistently has chosen expedient fixes, opting for the tactical solutions natural to the field soldier. But he has left Pakistan in a strategic muddle as he and his paladins attempt to placate the U.S. in its war against terrorism, while hesitating to pursue the bold actions against fanatics and renegades necessary if the state is ever to grow healthy--not least because the extremists have been fervent allies on the Kashmir issue. Gen. Musharraf has tried to have it both ways--postponing internal and external confrontations, but moving Pakistan no closer to enduring solutions.
The U.S. is far from blameless. Washington simply turned its back on Pakistan after the Russians left Afghanistan, exacerbating problems American policies had deepened: metastasizing extremism, endemic corruption, and a casual availability of weapons that would make the NRA swoon. Pakistan responded to Washington's desertion by attempting to create strategic depth for its endless crisis with India by backing the Taliban regime and its now-notorious consorts in Afghanistan.
After 9/11, Gen. Musharraf's best chance was to recognize that Islamabad's Afghan policy had failed dangerously and to turn his back resolutely on those who had designed it. He and his supporters needed to purge the extremist elements that had crowded into the Inter Services Intelligence agency and, to a lesser extent, the military. Instead, Gen. Musharraf played musical chairs at the top, while leaving the radicalized field structures largely intact. He now heads an internally divided government, in which some elements cooperate impressively with American counterparts, while others work to protect violent extremists and preserve terrorist networks.
Despite his indefatigable sense of duty, the demands of his position have been too much for Gen. Musharraf. His recent nuclear tantrums vis-à-vis India are not evidence of a bloodthirsty spirit, but of the pressures of trying to serve too many demanding constituencies without a coherent strategy--beyond threatening an enormous, far-more-powerful neighbor with devastation.
Meanwhile, the military, the ISI and the rest of the government are torn between the very human anxiety to back the ultimate winner and loyalties to the state, to the institutional military, to self-perpetuating bureaucracies, to friends and allies hunted by America, to family and tribe, and to competing visions of Islam.
Could the Pakistani government do more in the war against terror? Certainly. But the military is terrified of breaking the longstanding patterns of doing business that have allowed the pretences of a state to continue. The military could move forcefully into the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan, but it does not see the risk of casualties and bloody rebellion as worth taking just to please America's passing fancy. Pakistanis remember all too well that the U.S. walked away from them before.
East of the Indus, the government is willing to pursue known terrorists--especially if they are not Pakistani nationals. But it has been unwilling to take a stand against the organized domestic extremists whose avowed goal is to remake Pakistan as a strict Islamic state and who sponsor violence to achieve their ends. All the while the mirage of a "liberated" Kashmir blinds Pakistan's leadership to the country's rational self-interest.
At present, Washington has no choice but to work--carefully--with Gen. Musharraf, a head of state who insists on a sovereignty he cannot enforce over territory that continues to harbor both international terrorists and Afghan renegades. There are no better options available to Washington than continuing to pressure the Pakistani government behind closed doors, while avoiding any public humiliation of a leader who, however imperfect, remains preferable to any known alternatives. On the crucial issue of the hot pursuit of terrorists across the Afghan border into Pakistan, the U.S. must not be deterred, but must go to all possible lengths to maintain public deniability.
Perhaps the best for which we can hope is that Pakistan will continue to muddle through, never quite collapsing. Incremental progress against Pakistan-based terrorists may be the best level of cooperation we realistically can expect, given the indecisive nature of the Musharraf regime. Increasingly, Pakistan looks like a problem that can only be contained, not solved. Meanwhile, the long-term strategic and economic interests of the U.S. lie across the border in India and we must manage our engagement on the subcontinent artfully. While the U.S. should endeavor to defuse nuclear confrontations, it must avoid any involvement in the insoluble Kashmir issue, in which an honest broker would merely alienate both parties. Finally, Washington must plan for various scenarios were the current government in Islamabad to fall, if Gen. Musharraf were to be assassinated, or, the worst case, if hostilities were to break out between India and Pakistan.
In Gen. Musharraf, the U.S. is bound to a Hamlet, a man torn between action and inaction. We cannot exit the stage, but we should avoid too close an embrace of the leading actor.
Mr. Peters, a retired Army officer, is the author, most recently, of "Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World" (Stackpole, 2002).
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002934Hamlet of the Indus
He truly is a Hamlet
============
Hamlet of the Indus
Supporting Musharraf is America's worst option in Pakistan--except all the others.
BY RALPH PETERS
Sunday, January 19, 2003 12:01 a.m. EST
Whenever a voice on the airwaves generalizes about Pakistan, I want to ask, "Which Pakistan do you mean?" Beyond the facade of a flag and customs officers at major airports, there is no integral, unified state behind the name. Does the pundit mean the feudal territories east of the Indus river, which resemble 15th-century England with electricity? Or the tribal lands to the west, where the blood feuds and clan rule of medieval Scotland are supercharged by religious ferocity?
Does the Pentagon spokesperson mean the megacity of Karachi, which the government cannot rule firmly, or the frontier settlements where Islamabad does not even pretend to rule, deferring to tribal elders? Mughal Pakistan yearning for the "liberation" of Kashmir, or Pathan Pakistan dreaming of a Pukhtunistan between Kabul and Peshawar? Mohajir or Baluch Pakistan? Or Islamic Pakistan, blaming unbelievers for its self-inflicted failures?
Today's Pakistan is a military pretending its sponsor is a functioning state. The government shows little sense of responsibility for the welfare of the man on the street or the woman in the field. Pakistani identity succumbs when tribal, family, ethnic or regional rivalries come into play. The adjective lawless often is used to describe the vast Northwest Frontier Province adjoining Afghanistan. Yet that territory may be the strictest rule-of-law portion of the country--although the law is not one of ratified constitutions, but of Pukhtunwali, of the tribe, based upon religion and cultural traditions immune to modernity. Any foreign businessman can attest that the "lawless" parts of Pakistan are those most evidently under control of the government.
The contradictions compound. As a firm believer in democracy and the rule of law, I nonetheless recognize that military government is the best, if feeble, hope for keeping Pakistan together and making any progress at all. Even the most nationalistic Pakistanis will tell you that the civilian politicians pandered to cancerous extremists and ignored the law whenever they could not exploit it to family advantage.
Which leaves us with Pervez Musharraf, a Hamlet in khaki, as Pakistan's head of state.
Gen. Musharraf is, without question, a patriot. Those who know him describe him as a dutiful soldier, physically brave, conscientious and honest by local standards--but a man of limited vision. And that vision focuses obsessively on the reunification of Kashmir. Since the events of 9/11 returned America's attentions to Pakistan, Gen. Musharraf consistently has chosen expedient fixes, opting for the tactical solutions natural to the field soldier. But he has left Pakistan in a strategic muddle as he and his paladins attempt to placate the U.S. in its war against terrorism, while hesitating to pursue the bold actions against fanatics and renegades necessary if the state is ever to grow healthy--not least because the extremists have been fervent allies on the Kashmir issue. Gen. Musharraf has tried to have it both ways--postponing internal and external confrontations, but moving Pakistan no closer to enduring solutions.
The U.S. is far from blameless. Washington simply turned its back on Pakistan after the Russians left Afghanistan, exacerbating problems American policies had deepened: metastasizing extremism, endemic corruption, and a casual availability of weapons that would make the NRA swoon. Pakistan responded to Washington's desertion by attempting to create strategic depth for its endless crisis with India by backing the Taliban regime and its now-notorious consorts in Afghanistan.
After 9/11, Gen. Musharraf's best chance was to recognize that Islamabad's Afghan policy had failed dangerously and to turn his back resolutely on those who had designed it. He and his supporters needed to purge the extremist elements that had crowded into the Inter Services Intelligence agency and, to a lesser extent, the military. Instead, Gen. Musharraf played musical chairs at the top, while leaving the radicalized field structures largely intact. He now heads an internally divided government, in which some elements cooperate impressively with American counterparts, while others work to protect violent extremists and preserve terrorist networks.
Despite his indefatigable sense of duty, the demands of his position have been too much for Gen. Musharraf. His recent nuclear tantrums vis-à-vis India are not evidence of a bloodthirsty spirit, but of the pressures of trying to serve too many demanding constituencies without a coherent strategy--beyond threatening an enormous, far-more-powerful neighbor with devastation.
Meanwhile, the military, the ISI and the rest of the government are torn between the very human anxiety to back the ultimate winner and loyalties to the state, to the institutional military, to self-perpetuating bureaucracies, to friends and allies hunted by America, to family and tribe, and to competing visions of Islam.
Could the Pakistani government do more in the war against terror? Certainly. But the military is terrified of breaking the longstanding patterns of doing business that have allowed the pretences of a state to continue. The military could move forcefully into the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan, but it does not see the risk of casualties and bloody rebellion as worth taking just to please America's passing fancy. Pakistanis remember all too well that the U.S. walked away from them before.
East of the Indus, the government is willing to pursue known terrorists--especially if they are not Pakistani nationals. But it has been unwilling to take a stand against the organized domestic extremists whose avowed goal is to remake Pakistan as a strict Islamic state and who sponsor violence to achieve their ends. All the while the mirage of a "liberated" Kashmir blinds Pakistan's leadership to the country's rational self-interest.
At present, Washington has no choice but to work--carefully--with Gen. Musharraf, a head of state who insists on a sovereignty he cannot enforce over territory that continues to harbor both international terrorists and Afghan renegades. There are no better options available to Washington than continuing to pressure the Pakistani government behind closed doors, while avoiding any public humiliation of a leader who, however imperfect, remains preferable to any known alternatives. On the crucial issue of the hot pursuit of terrorists across the Afghan border into Pakistan, the U.S. must not be deterred, but must go to all possible lengths to maintain public deniability.
Perhaps the best for which we can hope is that Pakistan will continue to muddle through, never quite collapsing. Incremental progress against Pakistan-based terrorists may be the best level of cooperation we realistically can expect, given the indecisive nature of the Musharraf regime. Increasingly, Pakistan looks like a problem that can only be contained, not solved. Meanwhile, the long-term strategic and economic interests of the U.S. lie across the border in India and we must manage our engagement on the subcontinent artfully. While the U.S. should endeavor to defuse nuclear confrontations, it must avoid any involvement in the insoluble Kashmir issue, in which an honest broker would merely alienate both parties. Finally, Washington must plan for various scenarios were the current government in Islamabad to fall, if Gen. Musharraf were to be assassinated, or, the worst case, if hostilities were to break out between India and Pakistan.
In Gen. Musharraf, the U.S. is bound to a Hamlet, a man torn between action and inaction. We cannot exit the stage, but we should avoid too close an embrace of the leading actor.
Mr. Peters, a retired Army officer, is the author, most recently, of "Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World" (Stackpole, 2002).
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002934Hamlet of the Indus
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