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More good news Al-Khalid goes to full production

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    More good news Al-Khalid goes to full production

    Al-Khalid is comparable to the best tanks of the world but cost half as much. May be after the failure of Arjun and 25 years down the drain India can also import Al-Khalid from us. On second thought they don't need Al-Khalid they have best of the Russian, what they need is man behind the machine more then the machine itself.

    Pak to roll out Al-Khalid tanks next month

    Pakistan will roll out the first batch of 15 main battle tank Al-Khalid for trials next month.

    The First batch of 15 Al-Khalid tanks, manufactured in collaboration with China, will be handed over to the Pakistan Army after its rolling out in July, Pakistani daily The Nation quoted defence officials as saying.
    Pakistan military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf would formally flag off the tanks in July, they said.

    The regular production would start towards the end of 2002, they said, adding Pakistan's Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) hopes to manufacture 50 tanks a year Al-Khalid, a Sino-Pak joint venture, is believed to be superior to the T-90 tank which India planned to purchase, the officials said, adding it has exceptional mobility, effective protection and excellent fire power supported by a hunter killer capability.

    only tanks pakistan needs is water tanks to
    combat water shortage.


      wat pakistan needs is both battle tanka as well as water tanks...lets hope pakis get both.


        History of Al-Khalid:

        The first prototype of this tank rolled out in June 1991 and is truly a
        dream come true in Pakistan's quest for self reliance. This project is an
        end product of project P-711which was initiated in 1988 to rebuild T-59
        tanks at Heavy Rebuild Factory(HRF),Taxilla.A step wise approach, carefull
        planning, hard work of hundreds of engineers and technicians and with the
        help of People's Republic of China a truly remarkable tank emerged as an end
        result.What started as a single facility for Project P-711 expanded to six
        new manufacturing projectsin a short period of time.P-882, all types of
        hulls.P-883, all types of turrets.P-884, all types of engines(from 520 HP to
        1500 HP)P-885, all types of guns (from 105mm to 203mm) P-886, flexible
        machining centre 8000 tons of cement,850 tons of reinforced steel, 1750 tons
        of structural steel and 1.3 million man hours were spent to establish these
        facilities .....within the period of one year! HRF relies on 360 factories
        nationwide for the manufacture of more than 4500 components for
        thisproject.This tank will initially consist of 70% Pak made components but
        this figure will gradually rise to 90%. Specifications:Crew: 3Combat
        Weight:48 tonsPower Weight ratio:25-30length in mm:6900Height in mm:2300Max
        road speed(km/h):62 Main Gun Caliber:125 smooth boreMuzzle
        velocity:1760/850/905Autu loader: yesAmmo storage: 39Engine
        Power:1200-1500Transmission:Auto-Hyd Composite(changable)Estimated Cost: 1.7
        million.Tank can fire APFSDS, HEAT and HE ammunition types.Secondary
        armament includes one 12.7mm and one 7.62 mm machine guns.Armour includes
        both composite and add on reactive armour.

        UPDATE(06/24/97): Chief of the Army Staff (COAS),General Jahangir Karamat
        visited the Southern desert areas and witnessed the trials of main battle
        tank-2000, Al-Khalid. This year the trials are being conducted on FP-3. The
        serial-production of tank is expected to start very soon.

        UPDATE(04/01/98): The serial production of Pakista's first
        indigenously-built Main Battle Tank Al-khalid is likely to start some time
        in the middle of 1999 as the final field trial of this tank will be
        conducted this summer. The Formation Commanders Conference (FCC), was
        briefed on some of the major projects of modernisation undertaken by the
        Army, including manufacture of Armoured personnel carriers, progress on the
        induction of Tank T-80UD, modernisation of T-59 tanks, indigenisation of
        MBT-2000 Al-Khalid, and locally-designed armoured command vehicles.

        UPDATE(05/06/99): A detailed briefing by chairman HIT was followed by
        display of equipment manufactured and modernised by the HIT and major
        defence production organisations which included tanks, armoured recovery
        vehicles, advanced ammunitions and APCs. The dignitaries were shown Main
        Battle Tank (MBT) Al-Khalid and were informed that the Army after exhaustive
        tests/trials had given a go ahead to move into the pilot production phase.
        Al-Khalid development programme commenced in 1990 and the very first
        conceptual prototype was launched in July 1991 by Nawaz Sharif who was also
        then prime minister. The programme had many research and development cycles.
        A number of federal ministers, Secretary Defence Lt Gen (Retd) Iftikhar Ali
        Khan, Secretary Defence Production Lt Gen (Retd) Lehrasab, Army Chief
        General Pervaz Musharraf, who is also Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
        Committee, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bokhari, and Chief of Air
        Staff Air Chief Marshal Pervaz Mehdi Qureshi were also present on the
        occasion. The development work of Al-Khalid tank has, however, been
        progressing at a fast pace and every year since then prototypes have been
        fielded for extensive trials resulting in improvement and perfection of
        different systems. Prolonged trials were conducted under varying terrain
        conditions recently and the Al-Khalid demonstrated exceptional performance
        under extremely difficult environment. The tank incorporates
        state-of-the-art features, which compare favourably with modern tanks of
        western origin. Al-Khalid carries a 125 mm smooth bore gun having an image
        stabilised fire control system, auto tracking and hunter killer capability.
        The tank has thermal imaging right vision sights and effect protection
        against present and future battlefield threats. It possesses a high-level of
        mobility and agility with a power of ratio in excess of 26:11. With these
        characteristics it is considered to be one of the most lethal and agile
        tanks in the world. The HIT where the tank will be manufactured has
        established adequate/infrastructure for indigenous manufacture of major
        components of the tank in Pakistan.


          AL-Khalid Bin Waleed was a fierce and a brave warrior who faught against muslims but latter converted to Islam.

          What India thinks of our Al-Khalid

          Significance of Al Khalid
          (Prem Shankar Jha on Pakistanís main battle tank)

          In the haze of well-being that has enveloped us after the Kargil war, not many
          people seem to have grasped the significance of Pakistanís announcement that it
          is beginning the production of its indigenously developed main battle tank, the Al
          Khalid. Even those who noticed may be inclined to dismiss its significance: hasnít
          Pakistan just learned the hard way that the world will simply not tolerate a nuclear
          power entering into a conventional war with another nuclear power? So who is it
          going to use the Al Khalid against anyway?
          Neither the complacency nor the condescension are warranted. For the issue is
          not whether India can place an order for and deploy a tank that will neutralise the Al
          Khalid. It is that Pakistanís minuscule defence research establishment is far more
          able to meet the countryís genuine defence needs than are the 36,000 scientists of
          the DRDO and its high profile chief, Dr. Abdul Kalam.

          Let me begin with the Al Khalid. Even a cursory look at its capabilities shows that
          except on one parameter, where no information was given in the news report, it is
          an armoured corps commanderís dream. In its offensive capabilities, and speed on
          level firm ground, it meets every requirement that the Indian armyís most up-to-date
          GSQR for Indiaís MBT project more than a decade ago. More important, it has a
          fire control system that enables it to acquire and shoot at targets while moving at
          high speeds over rough terrain. This is something that Indiaís mainstay, the T-72,
          cannot do (some are being upgraded to have this capability). The fact that all this
          capability has been packed in a tank with only a 1200 HP engine, means that it
          has an overall weight of 40 tonnes or thereabouts against the Arjunís 55 tonnes.
          This will give it a lower profile than the typical MBT and make it harder to hit.

          Chinaís technological help has undoubtedly played a very important part in its
          development. It is even possible that most of the parts and systems are Chinese.
          But it would be a mistake to belittle the specific Pakistani input. For Chinaís tanks
          have been designed, like European tanks, to work in relatively cool climates. An
          Indian or Pakistani tank must be capable of operating in Sindh in summer. This
          means up and down sand dunes in an ambient temperature of 50 degrees Celsius.
          Other than the American Abrams tank, and possibly an Israeli MBT, none of the
          tanks developed elsewhere has passed this test. The design of the Al Khalid would
          not have been sealed if it did not meet this requirement to an extent sufficient to
          satisfy the Pakistan Armoured Corps.

          The problem that DRDO failed to resolve, but Pakistan obviously has, is that diesel
          engines generate heat. The bigger they are, the more heat they generate and
          therefore the larger the proportion of the power that has to be diverted for air
          conditioning. The Arjun has a 1500 HP engine, but 300 HP gets used up in
          air-conditioning. As a result at 50 degrees Celsius the tank is able to travel only at
          a snailís pace and is a sitting duck.

          Attempts to solve this problem within the basic parameters of an engine that was
          developed in the early fifties have forced other compromises that gravely impair the
          Arjunís offensive capability and increase its vulnerability. Not surprisingly, the
          Indian army has flatly refused to induct the Arjun into the armoured corps in more
          than token numbers and is insisting on the purchase of the T-90. In short, after 16
          years of Ďresearchí the DRDO has produced a lemon.

          How could such a monumental waste of energy, time and money have come
          about? Pakistanís success with Al Khalid makes it essential that we answer this
          question now, before the afterglow of Kargil fades. The key difference is that in
          Pakistan, the army decides what it wants to buy, the army owns the defence
          production factories, and the army manages the defence research institutes. In
          India the armed forces have only a distant, passive say in the acquisition of
          weapons. Each service decides what kind of weapons it needs and with what
          capabilities. This is compiled into a QR ó quality requirement ó and handed over
          to the Defence Ministry. After that its role is to attend the supplier or the DRDOís
          trials, and at the final stage of selection just prior to induction, carry out its own
          field trials. Only if the MoD has selected more than one system, does it get to
          indicate its preference. That almost never happens. Even then, there is no certainty
          that this preference will be respected. This procedure breaks one of the cardinal
          rules of good management, which was discovered in a landmark study of
          relationship between Technology, Organisation and Business success by a team
          of researchers headed by the late Joan Woodward of the Imperial College of
          Technology in 1955-58. This is the necessity, in special order batch production for
          a constant and close interaction between the product user and manufacturer. The
          primacy of the army in Pakistan has, accidentally, ensured that this rule is
          respected in its defence research and development. The ascendancy of the
          Defence Ministry has made sure that it is not in India. What this has meant is that
          the armed forces no longer necessarily get what they want, but also when they
          need it.

          Examples abound. A 155mm howitzer was indented for in 1978. The Bofors was
          finally acquired in 1986. The eight-year delay meant that while Pakistan got its
          155mm howitzers in the early eighties for $850,000 a piece, India paid $ 3 million
          for each gun. As if that were not bad enough, following the outcry over kickbacks,
          Bofors was blacklisted from 1987 till after the Kargil war began in 1999. All that
          while the army was left with 400 of these guns instead of the 1200 it had wanted,
          and was starved of shells and spares to the point where it was compelled to
          cannibalise some of the guns in order to keep the others functioning. Its entreaties
          that the blacklist be lifted were ignored.

          India first failed to spot, and later took six weeks to ascertain the number of
          invaders in Kargil because among other reasons, its satellite did not have a
          sufficiently high resolution. At that precise time the government had signed an
          agreement with Russia for pictures from a satellite with a six times higher
          resolution, but they had not begun to arrive because the MoD had not paid the
          contract price!

          The problem has been complicated by the sudden rise of DRDO as a competing
          weapons provider. For now the army has to contend not only with the delays that
          are imposed upon it by ministry officials who feel no sense of urgency about doing
          their job, but also by the delay that arises when the DRDO chief insists that there
          is no need to import a weapon because he can design and produce it at home. The
          Arjun lemon is by no means the worst example of the cost this can impose on the
          army. In 1987 the American defence department finally and reluctantly cleared the
          sale of a WLR ó a gun locating radar that tracks artillery shells feeds the
          coordinates into oneís own guns and directs the return fire automatically to destroy
          the enemy gun from which the shell came ó to India. The army was ecstatic
          because Pakistan had had an American WLR since the eighties and the one the
          US were offering India was superior. The deal was finalised and the purchase was
          about to be made when, on the urging of Dr. Kalam, the then defence secretary
          cancelled it and decided to let DRDO develop a WLR instead!

          Two years later, the army still had no WLRs. As a result many young men who
          died in Kargil, fell victim to Pak artillery fire which the Indian guns could not
          suppress because they did not have WLRs. The all-pervasive fear in the armed
          forces is that with the return of peace, the MoD and DRDO will have neither learned
          nor forgotten anything. If Mr. Vajpayee has a lasting contribution to make it is to
          shift the boot from the MoDís foot to that of the Army. So far the army has
          proposed and the MoD has disposed. Now the MoD and DRDO may propose but
          the armed forces must dispose.


            Damn good news.
            Really good news.
            Really really good news.

            Our's not to reason why,
            Our's but to do and die:
            You can't fix stupid. So might as well troll them!