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    Living next to India without Capitulating


    It may not be on Indias agenda ,to arm for Pakistan,afterall,how many times can a man die & ibndia has 10 times the ammunition to kill over 10 times.So india is trying to equal China & be the superpower first of South Asia ,& then challenge China ,maybe.
    Meanwhile Pakistan is stuck in its vicinity feling the heat of nuclear cauldren brewing not far from iuts eastern borders.How can India say ,trust me ,when thee is no precednce of it (ala kashmir Accession)Dont fear me ,i wnt kill you ,how can home to 130 million muslim in the subcontinent believe you after 92- 6th dec destruction of mosque symbolically sounding the alarm as well threat to 500 millions of muslims of the subcxontinent.

    http://server35.hypermart.net/thefridaytimes/
    Living next to India without capitulating


    Khaled Ahmed'sA n a l y s i s

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There is in international politics no simple rule to prescribe just how
    belligerent, or how peaceful, any state should strive to appear in order
    to maximise it chances of living at peace with its neighbouring states.
    One cannot say in the abstract that for peace a country must arm, or
    disarm, or compromise, or stand firm.

    As competition in international politics becomes more intense, the
    peace-loving state faces the necessity of balancing between too little
    or too much strength, between too many failures that strengthen the
    potential enemy, and too many successes that scare him unduly.

    (Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War, 1959)

    'It is always wiser, where there is a choice, to trust to inertia. It is
    the greatest force in the world.'

    (Rex Stout's hero in the novel Fer-de-lance, 1934)

    India has increased its defence expenditure two years in a row: 28
    percent in 2000 and 14 percent in 2001. The first increase was equal to
    Pakistan's total defence budget. The second increase, as Pakistan's
    foreign secretary pointed out, brings the total increase to nearly 40
    percent in two years. This is a massive act of rearmament. Pakistan's
    reaction has been that this increase has upset the balance of security
    in the region although Islamabad has refrained from a tit-for-tat
    reaction by increasing its own defence budget. In fact, according to one
    newspaper report, in the year 2000, the army spent only Rs 61 billion
    from an allocated budget of Rs 133 billion. This self-denial, together
    with a cut in the development budget, actually brought the budget
    deficit down to 2.2 percent of the GDP in the beginning of 2001.

    By refusing to fall for the Indian invitation to escalation, Pakistan
    has chosen to give priority to its economy. It has announced no
    competitive increase in its defence budget. This is a break from the
    past when Pakistan was consistently seen as the 'imitative' state in
    South Asia, ready to match India, bomb for bomb, missile for missile. It
    had seemed that if India wanted it could make Pakistan do anything it
    pleased. In Islamabad, the safest policy in the face of a hawkish
    establishment was to simply follow India. Islamabad's mistrust of the
    international system also forced it to see India and Pakistan cloistered
    unequally together in the region without outsiders caring about the
    threat to world peace this represented. In the year 2001, however, the
    state of the national economy has brought Pakistan to the realisation
    that it was unwise to follow India's lead.

    Defining strategic balance:What is the military balance that Pakistan
    thinks has been disturbed by India's rearmament? Was it there before the
    escalation? And if it has been disturbed, why has Pakistan's 'restraint'
    since 2000 not put it at risk? The answer to these questions is not easy
    because the concept of balance is not entirely computable for all kinds
    of people looking at the problem. Pakistan has what has been called an
    'equaliser' nuclear device. Going nuclear has presumably redressed the
    imbalance that had existed between the two conventional armies. Then, if
    the 'equaliser' is there, why should Indian rearmament bother Pakistan?
    Is India's escalation in response to the proxy war in Kashmir? India's
    escalation has not reduced Pakistan's ability to carry out this proxy
    war, at least not yet.

    Different Pakistanis look at the proxy war in different ways. Some
    oppose it and think that in the ripeness of time, it will lead to an
    all-out war, that some day it will all be beyond India's tolerance and a
    war will ensue. Some support the proxy war but arrive at the same
    conclusion by arguing that India might resort to war to end it. In both
    cases, there is an implicit lack of confidence in the 'deterrence'
    achieved by the two countries through their nuclear devices. During the
    Kargil Operation, the 'deterrence' worked for some time, then gave way
    to the fear that an all-out war may be started by India, which in turn
    will force Pakistan to resort to a nuclear strike. At least this is what
    prime minister Nawaz Sharif was made to think, superseding his earlier
    faith in the 'deterrence'. The question is: is India increasing its
    defence budget to impose a war on Pakistan?

    Rearmament and war:If the past is any indication, India may not be
    spending more on arms to wage a war on Pakistan. A war of aggression by
    India will immediately lead to a nuclear stand-off because of Pakistan's
    inability to absorb a conventional attack on its territory. On the other
    hand, past record shows Pakistan, rather than India, taking aggressive
    steps after rearmament. This is understandable because Pakistan is the
    'reactionary' state unhappy with the status quo which it is committed to
    overturning. Anyone outside South Asia will come to the conclusion that
    India's escalation is not a preparation for a military assault on
    Pakistan but to create in Pakistan a psychological reaction that may
    favour its strategy of the status quo. If Pakistan replies by rearming,
    the economic price entailed by it will break its back and it will
    submerge in a civil war. If Pakistan does not 'reply' in kind, it will
    succumb psychologically to the conclusion that taking on India is
    against its survival. In other words, more and more opinion-makers in
    Pakistan may support the policy of gradually switching off the jehad in
    Kashmir.

    India and the rest of the world are watching the cost to Pakistan of the
    jehad it has unleashed. It has aroused concern in the neighbourhood and
    a regional coalition seems to be emerging against it. But more than
    that, it is at risk from indigenous elements which represent the
    internal cost of jehad. In this scenario, India wants to be seen as
    unvanquishable. An increase in military spending can also be a response
    to the general Indian feeling that India is helpless to put an end to
    the insurrection in Kashmir and stop the 'cross-border interference'
    from Pakistan. A political consensus in India after Kargil also allows
    the BJP government to rearm without any political backlash. A very
    convincing reason for India's escalation has been given by Prof Anwar
    Syed ( Dawn 4 March 2001):

    India as status quo hegemon:'Even though it has never been stated quite
    so bluntly, the fact remains that India's prescription for Pakistan is
    plain and writ large. India wants Pakistan to understand that by
    comparison it is a small country, that it should refrain from annoying
    India in the international forums, and that even if it will not be a
    stooge it should stop opposing India's ambition and effort to act as a
    big power in world politics. This is more than a mouthful for most
    Pakistanis to swallow. Yet it is a fact of life that Pakistan cannot be
    an effective rival of India in international politics, nor is it in a
    position to stop India from building influence in its region which (in
    its perception) includes Southeast Asia, the oil-producing countries
    along the Gulf, Iran, Afghanistan and the newly independent Central
    Asian republics.'

    Prof Syed goes on in his article to correctly advise that it is not for
    Pakistan to 'balance' the influence of India in the region. It can
    however do that in tandem with other states that may in time seek to
    introduce this balance in the region. Military and non-military powers
    like Japan, Australia, China, the United States, may all seek this
    balance in times to come. Pakistan can position itself now for a
    peaceful coalition against India in the future when India's actions in
    the region begin to be seen as 'unbalancing'. Pakistan can do that by
    quickly reducing its international isolation through a flexible foreign
    policy. As things stand however Pakistan sticks out in the region as a
    state that militates against peace. That it is in possession of a
    nuclear device does not gain it friends; it simply increases
    international fear and loathing. Possession of nuclear weapons must go
    together with an image of a peace-loving, cooperative and internally
    responsible state.

    Pakistan's image as a belligerent state:Kenneth Waltz in his book Man,
    the State and War has posited that war occurs because of three factors:
    that there should be men in charge of the state who prefer war over
    peace; that the nature of the state be such that it is constrained to
    wage war; and that the international system is configured in such a way
    that war becomes inevitable. He is careful to point out that any one of
    these factors or 'images' cannot be solely responsible for the waging of
    war but a combination of all the three. If we apply the theory to
    Pakistan, all the three factors seem to be coalescing against it. The
    'man' in Pakistan has a predominant mindset favouring war; the state has
    become jehadi, threatening friends and foes in the neighbourhood with a
    war it cannot completely control; and that there is a rapidly growing
    international coalition of forces (Islamic and non-Islamic alike)
    interested in 'reducing' Pakistan as a semi-rogue nuclear state which,
    in their perception, is helpless in creating conditions of war, both
    covert and overt, regionally and extra-regionally.

    The question is if Pakistan cannot pursue its present policy of
    aggressive reaction, can Pakistan abandon it without capitulating to
    India? Most Pakistanis think that not fighting India would mean giving
    in to India. It is definitely not a question of capitulation, but an
    alternative policy requiring a flexibility of approach. And that comes
    only if you are fully in control of the state internally and there is a
    national consensus on ending internal disorder. This brings us to the
    ticklish topic of sovereignty. States not internally cohesive soon lose
    external sovereignty too. The threats delivered to foreign states by the
    various actors in Pakistan's jehad create the conditions for this loss
    of sovereignty, as happened in the 18th century Tokugawa Japan. Japan's
    historic 'anti-foreignism' caused the samurai to kill foreign traders
    till the latter would trade only on the condition of
    extra-territoriality and positioning of private troops. Japan lost its
    sovereignty gradually as it traded with foreigners. Would foreign states
    be justified in approaching Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Mufti Shamzai for
    the protection of their nationals? If events continue to take the wrong
    turn, this might happen, stripping Pakistan of internal sovereignty as
    well.

    Balancing the threat of another state may be a very complex process.
    There is no settled point beyond which an aggressive or defensive
    rearmament may actually lead to war, but there are definitely more than
    one ways of achieving security without taking military steps. One step
    definitely is to remove the threat that the rearming state perceives.
    This is possible without becoming vulnerable because of Pakistan's
    possession of the nuclear bomb. The other is to move towards arranging
    an international coalition for peace, after dismantling policies that
    reinforce isolationism. Most importantly, Pakistan should seriously
    think of changing its hostile policy towards those South Asian states
    that counter India through cooperation rather than confrontation.

    ------------------

    "jo kHat main kahte they apni jaan mujhko
    aaj kHat likhne main unki jaan jaati hai .....;!

    [This message has been edited by FYI (edited March 17, 2001).]

    #2
    If all else fails, nuke em...

    Comment


      #3
      Originally posted by Topee Wala:
      If all else fails, nuke em...
      Originally posted by Topee Wala:
      If all else fails, nuke em...
      I dont think Pakistan needed nuclear capacity ,but for insistence of Hindu india on persistently underestimating muslims.Now being coward they are ,they will think twice before trying any tricks like in 65 & 72 that what nuclear capability has bought ,no matter whatevr it might have cost in money.

      Only thing that pakisan is worried about this 10 times size hulk breathing on our shoulder.Pakistans greatest threat is India spl. with Kashmir issue in limbo!

      ------------------


      barque(bijli) yoon akadti hai apne karname pe ke
      jaise phir naya hum aashiyaan bana nahi sakte

      Comment


        #4
        Who was bigger in 1965??? How come Pakistan was able to bring india on it's knees?? To fight a war.. we need courage and love for our homeland.. its a fact that Pakistan has enough power even without nukes to fight a war that should be enough to break indias back.
        There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the end the sword will always be conquered by the spirit. --Napoleon Bonaparte

        Comment


          #5
          We dont need a war.. divide and conqur. Make a little Kashmir in every nook and corner of India and wait and see how long they last. In this day and age you dont need wars but proxy wars. Infect India with a virus and that will bring it down.

          Comment


            #6

            Pureland, Topee walae,

            did you read the article? pakistan is just as vulnerable to nuking and separatist movements as india. the article puts forth a mature view on how pakistan can successfully rise to its full potential. do read it before you guys decide to shoot from the hip again and try to take the discussion into the beaten track of braggadacio and war-time fairy tales.
            Simple ain't easy.

            Comment

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