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    Afghan-Pak teritorial dispute.

    It will be interesting what stand future govts. in afghanistan take on this issue. as far as i know, taliban do not accept durand line.


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Focus on Durand Line

    Brig. (Retd) A.R. Siddiqi
    The Durand Line is, once again, in the limelight. It remains a subject of detailed discussions at high level meetings in Islamabad. The need for greater vigilance on the border with Afghanistan is stressed to prevent the illegal cross-border movement of goods and people. Islamabad plans to 'impress upon' the Taliban the urgent need and importance of effective measures against the fresh influx of Afghan refugees through the 'porous' Durand Line.
    Last week (January 11) the Area Study Centre for Central Asia and Russia of the Peshawar University organised a colloquium for a scholarly discussion of the geostrategic importance of the Durand Line. The various presentations made revolved round a definitive study of the Durand Line, its history and role, as a 'razor edge' frontier by Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, the centre's director.
    Dr. Azmat Hayat quotes Lord Curzon to differentiate between an established international border and a frontier, or a frontier state. 'Frontiers,' said Lord Curzon, 'are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life and death to the nations'. The western frontier of Pakistan, comments Azmat, is indeed a 'razor's edge,' frontier on which hangs the future of Southern Asia. And Afghanistan stays as the hub or the pivotal country, west of the Durand Line, of South-Asian peace, in its all-embracing continental context. The British realised that, and, through a judicious blend of war and peace, threat and persuasion, manipulation of dynastic and tribal rivalries, above all outright bribery, drew Afghanistan firmly into their strategic dragnet.
    Surprisingly, and, no less painfully, the Durand Line, which should have been a frontier of peace and tranquility between the two fraternal Islamic neighbours, turned into a zone of conflict and confrontation. The Afghan monarchy challenged the relevance and status of the Durand Line after the British left India. The Afghan challenge to the continuing relevance of the Durand Line was rooted mainly in their reduced one-party (ex parte) perception of the Line after the disappearance of the British. That left Afghanistan as the only other signatory to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1893 to end its bilateral status.
    Named after its principal author, Sir Mortimar Durand, the Line was drawn on November 12, 1893 and demarcated on the ground through the next three or four years. It was ratified and confirmed by the successive Afghan governments and has since stayed as the established boundary between British India (now Pakistan) and Afghanistan.
    The Line begins at the Sarikol range of the Pamirs in the north, and runs south-west all the way up to the Iranian border in the rocky area of Kohi Malik Siah, the inhospitable desert regions beyond the Helmand river.
    Azmat projects the Durand Line as a major strand in the intricate web of moves and countermoves in the Anglo-Russian Great Game through the second half of the 19th century. In his own words: 'The history of the 19th century is consequently a history of moves and countermoves on the part of Russia and British which finally resulted in the emergence of Afghanistan as a buffer state in the demarcation of frontiers'.
    More than a buffer state or a terminus between British India (subsequently Pakistan) and Czarist Russia (subsequently the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation) Afghanistan was first exposed to creeping communist infiltration followed by naked military aggression in December 1979. The resulting nine-year long war and military occupation led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the entrapment of Afghanistan in the on-going bitter civil war.
    The Durand Agreement of 1893 was reaffirmed by the Anglo-Afghan treaties of August 1919, November 22, 1927 and of 1930. Professor Rizvi in his Frontiers of Pakistan throws much useful light on the unquestionable legal status of the Durand Line. He goes on to quote Sir Olaf Caroe to the effect that these two documents 'only recognised the legitimate Afghan interest in British dealings with the tribes on the common frontier', and did not say a word about the Afghans' rights on the British side of the Durand Line. (Sir Olaf Caroe in his article 'North West Frontier: A Bone of Contention' — The London Times, February 1, 1968)
    The Government of India Act 1935, formally defined India as including the area known as Tribal Territory, in accordance with its delineation on official maps. With the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Pakistan the res transit cum suo oneri treaties of the extinct state concerning boundary lines...remain valid and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the absorbing state.
    There had been considerable confusion over the definition of term Pakhtoonistan — whether it meant the creation of an independent Pathan state within or outside Pakistan as a part of Afghanistan or involved a mere change of name. In Afghanistan itself the matter aroused a considerable amount of controversy even at the official level. On June 13, 1948, Shah Wali Khan, the Afghan envoy to Pakistan, at a party in his honour by the Aligarh Old Boys' Association, categorically declared: 'Our King has already stated, and I, as the representative of Afghanistan, declare that Afghanistan has no claims on frontier territory, and even if there were any, they have been given up in favour of Pakistan. Anything contrary to this which may have appeared in the Press in the past or may appear in the future should not be given credence at all and should be considered just a canard.'
    About the same time, the official Kabul daily, Anis, supported by Kabul Radio, demanded that the territory between the Durand Line and the Indus River should be amalgamated with Afghanistan. However, writes Rizvi, a statement supporting the views expressed by his Ambassador was soon issued by the Counsellor of the Afghan Embassy in Karachi. This led to an unusual situation in which Kabul Radio challenged the authority of the Afghan envoy to speak for his own government. These contradictions not only created an awkward position for the envoy, but also proved to be detrimental to Pak-Afghan relations.
    In July 1949, the Afghan Parliament declared that "it does not recognise the imaginary Durand or any similar Line". Kabul Radio and the Afghan Press intensified their propaganda, inciting the tribesmen living on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line to revolt in the name of 'Pakhtoonistan'.
    In Pakistan also the definition of Pakhtoonistan remained as confused and obscure. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the principal exponent of Pakhtoonistan, stated in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in 1948 that he simply wanted "the renaming of his province as Pakhtoonistan. Like Sindh, Punjab, etc." But on October 2, 1949, while visiting India, he was reported to have expressed confidence that a separate state of 'Pakhtoonistan' comprising north-western areas of Pakistan would soon be formed.
    The raging controversy led to a series of grave crises between the two countries including 'severance' of diplomatic relations in 1955 and military operation around Bajaur in 1961. Amusingly enough, the chain of grave crises was relieved by such essentially utopian and patently unworkable ideas about the formation of a triangular Afghan-Pakistan-Iran confederation. It had all along been a somewhat ambivalent relationship torn between two equitable pulls — the Afghan irredentism on one side and Pakistan's quest for strategic depth on the other.
    The Durand Line, whether as an inviolable international boundry drawn by an imperialist power, or as a relatively permeable Pak-Afghan frontier, remains as active factor as ever in Central South Asian geopolitics. In fact, its importance, in view of the raging volitality across the Taliban Afghanistan and the instability in the Central Asian Republics, has inestimably increased.
    It is here that Russia, Central and South Asia, inclusive of India, would meet to extend its influence right up to Eastern Europe. The road to Vienna and Paris, said Lenin, lay through Afghanistan and Delhi (Islamabad). The formulation is no longer just an empty dream, but a tangibly material prospect waiting to crystalise. How long might it take for the dream to become a reality would depend on how soon the regional players — mainly India and Pakistan on the one hand the CARs and Russia on the other — are able to join forces in joint ventures for collective good and development of their vast resources, abounding in natural gas and oil.


    #2
    pakistan will put afghanistan through meat grinder and make them weak until afghan
    people have nothing left in them then they will take them over . so pakistan needs more
    room and places in the high mountains to hide their nuke. this their plan so far its
    working.

    Comment


      #3
      Originally posted by rvikz:
      pakistan will put afghanistan through meat grinder and make them weak until afghan
      people have nothing left in them then they will take them over . so pakistan needs more
      room and places in the high mountains to hide their nuke. this their plan so far its
      working.
      Now..now..now...

      What do we have here?
      The Brits lingo?
      Divide and rule? ahahhahahahahaaha......

      As far as i can see, it could be two things: Pakistan running the Taliban.
      Or the Taliban running Pakistan

      Well no matter what, in both of these cases you know your next!



      ------------------
      *We are the Taleban-Resistance is Futile*
      YB Osama Bin Junior.

      Comment


        #4
        ZZ what gives you the idea that the Taliban rulers don't accept the Durand line? Is there any statement that they have made in this regard? Have they brought up this 'dispute' with the Pakistani governmnent?

        If one takes a closer reading of the Taliban position on cross-border relations with Pakistan, one will be surprised to lean that they hold a view which is diametrically opposed to what you seem to be arguing.

        ---

        Comment


          #5
          From dawn 13 may 2000

          Danger from the north


          By M.P. Bhandara


          PAKISTAN'S alliance or misalliance with the Afghan Taliban these past five years parallels an internal gravitational shift seeking
          accommodation with the politics of the sectarian right. The sanctum sanctorum of the begoted sectarian right is the Taliban of
          Afghanistan, whose movement is closely supported by the ISI - our intelligence agency more notorious than real to most Pakistanis.

          To both their terms of office Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were elected on fairly liberal platforms; once in office both trimmed
          their sails to the winds of the sectarian right in their own ways.

          The Afghan Taliban were not entirely the creation of the ISI. It was the chaos of post-Najibullah Afghanistan that inspired a group
          of Afghan madressah students to try to stem the rot. They were radical but honest; though violent, they brought peace to the land by
          restoring law and order. And in the early years these were welcomed in the territories that fell to them. At long last some light and
          hope appeared at the end of the Afghan tunnel. But, as the Taliban consolidated their power, all these hopes were shattered.

          Slowly but surely they began to show their fanatic colours. The ISI fed, nurtured, mollycoddled and armed these young men and
          helped them conquer 90 per cent of Afghanistan. Today Central Asia trembles at their name.

          The Taliban have been charged with atrocious crimes. Their behaviour towards women is harsh and degrading. They have no real
          education nor culture and appear devoid of any sense of reciprocity. And in a strange reversal of roles we seem to be obedient to
          the dictates of our protege. Indeed, it is increasingly the case of the tail wagging the dog.

          A large number of these Taliban are "products" of our tribal borderland madressahs. At these seminaries, a sort of Islamic catechism
          was drilled into the heads of these eager stalwarts. No test of the curricula is available, but it must have been of a highly combustible
          sort. No history, geography, science, mathematics or even Islam in its broader sense was taught. Only a few single-track religious
          dogmas culled on a self-serving basis; and the history of the world past, present and future seen through a topsy-turvy prism.

          Not much effort was needed to teach Afghan boys the use of deadly weapons and plenty of ammunition was available during and
          after the Afghan war to practise shooting straight. These armed and indoctrinated young militants are the spiritual descendants of the
          Brown Shirts of Hitlerite Germany, Stalin's youth brigades, the Black Shirts of Mussolini and Mao's Cultural Revolutionary Guards.
          Auden captured this mood in the dark night of Europe in the 1930s: "And made it his mature ambition/ To think no thought but ours
          -/ To hunger, work illegally/ And be anonymous."

          These youth brigades brought death, destruction and unspeakable cruelty to their country in the name of race, ethnicity and utopias
          of one kind or another. It appears that the Taliban are the last such grouping of the 20th century; the Serbs narrowly preceded
          them.

          The question before us is what do we do with this begoted lot next door?

          The Taliban are almost 100 per cent Pukhtun. And Pukhtuns straddle both sides of the Durand Line. This soft border and the
          sharing of language, ethnicity and religious mores have the potential of rekindling the Pukhtunistan demand of yore. And it would
          take all the king's men and all the king's horses if our protege Mulla Omar were to turn on his benefactor, Pakistan, some day and
          demand a Pukhtun state with its capital in Peshawar.

          The Bin Laden factor has complicated the matter beyond measure for Pakistan. Most countries do not buy the plea that we have
          little or no leverage on Mulla Omar. We must have. Without food, arms, logistics support and petroleum supplies from Pakistan, the
          Taliban are near dead. But such is the fascination that Omar exercises on Pakistan that making snarling noises we refuse to pressure
          our protege even when he harbours our own sectarian terrorists charged with multiple murders.

          Afghanistan today is a sanctuary and training ground for the Pakistani terrorists. Clearly, Pakistan's position becomes contradictory
          and untenable. It is this contradiction in pursuing conflicting aims which has brought about a paralysis within the organs of our state.
          To put it bluntly, what our law proposes the ISI disposes. And the function of the Foreign Office is no longer to formulate and
          execute a neighbourhood policy but to put a deceitful gloss on the operations of the ISI. On the rough seas of this turbulent region
          our ship of state is rudderless. Today, we have no friend from Tehran to Tashkent, in Washington or in Moscow. Our traditional
          ally, the People's Republic of China, is curiously silent and apprehensive lest the religious Pakistan-Afghan fanatics infect the
          Xinjiang Muslim region of China.

          Pakistan's support to the Taliban has alienated us from the rest of the world. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan emerges as the
          world's largest producer of opium and heroin. The Emirate is a narco-economy. We may not feel hot under the collar about the
          American fixation with Bin Laden but what about our own terrorists? Those, for instance, charged with spraying bullets on Muslims
          praying in Shia mosques who have been seen loitering in the rubble bazaars of Kandahar?

          The Taliban have also given a new dimension to mass torture. After the last conquest of Mazar-i-Sharif, opponents were locked in
          steel containers and left to die under the desert sun. The killing of Najibullah, then living in UN custody in Kabul, was so gruesome
          that one hesitates to repeat the details.

          One wonders what madness has entered the heads of our policy-makers to continue recognition and support for the Taliban. If the aim was to have a government which was pliant and amenable to Islamabad, we are tragically mistaken. It is reported that the Taliban have refused to officially recognize the Durand Line. The only other backers of the Taliban, the Saudis, have reduced relations to a bare minimum after Prince Turki, the Saudi intelligence chief, was insulted by Mullah Omar. It is reported that the
          House of Saud was also abused.

          Good luck to our chief executive who also plans a visit to Kandahar to meet Mullah Omar in the near future.

          Clearly the time has come to read the Riot Act to the Taliban. Is it possible to suffer a friend and a protege who harbours our worst
          enemies? How long can we suffer a friend who has not the least regard for world concerns as well as our own? How long will we
          suffer the economic drain of the porous border? Is it not galling to hear the Bara traders say that the law of Pakistan does not apply
          to them? Is it not high time they were brought under the sky of Pakistan? And the war of Kashmir liberation can well do without the
          Afghan, Arab and Pakistan liberators who have made a very worthy cause unworthy by use of means which are unacceptable. The
          Kashmiris are quite capable of achieving their liberation without the messy involvement of outsiders. The Kashmiris do not need any
          crutches from Pakistan or others.

          As regards the Taliban and Afghanistan, three suggestions of practical application are proposed:

          * The Taliban be asked to surrender our known sectarian absconders and terrorists forthwith and the camps of these terrorist
          organizations be closed down by the Taliban. There should be no such thing as a multi-purpose camp, sponsoring sectarian violence
          in Pakistan and jihad in Kashmir.

          * To resolve the Bin Laden problem, it be proposed to the Americans that they present any evidence that they may have to a
          committee of the OIC. If the committee is of the opinion that prima facie case exists against Bin Laden, the Taliban must hand him
          over to justice. If they refuse, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE should withdraw recognition of the Taliban regime.

          * The Taliban should be warned by Pakistan not to invade the northern territory occupied by Ahmad Shah Masud in these coming
          months. If it does, all movements of arms and petroleum supplies through Pakistan would cease.

          Pakistan must renew its traditional friendship with Iran and take a lead in forcing the combatants to a multi-ethnic, cultural
          government in Kabul.

          [This message has been edited by ZZ (edited January 17, 2001).]

          Comment


            #6
            ZZ I would appreciate if you and others would post the source of your articles. And who is M.P. Bhandara?

            Are you basing your whole argument on one short line of mere speculation? The whole article seems biased against the Taliban, laden with inaccuracies and highly speculative. From some of the events it mentions, like the treatment of the Saudi Prince Turki, the article is a bit dated? Can you confirm that?

            [This message has been edited by Mursalin (edited January 17, 2001).]

            Comment


              #7
              Last week, in the NYTimes, there were 3 long writeups (Sun, Mon, Tue) on Jihad and Terrorism. Afghans have no love for Pakistanis per say. Their only interest is to get Arms and training from Pakistanis, in addition to luring Pakistani kids into their civil rift. Afghans refer to Pakistanis fighting there as Punjabis.

              Comment


                #8
                www.dawn.com/2000/05/13/op.htm

                Comment


                  #9
                  Ah ZZ opinion does not make it fact now does it???
                  That link is to the opinion section of the paper.
                  Why don't you post some of the opinions which say that the CE is doing a great job???

                  NYA:
                  Afghans have no love for Pakistanis per say.

                  really, did these articles say so???
                  And who exactly did they quote???
                  The Northern Alliance???

                  Afghans refer to Pakistanis fighting there as Punjabis.

                  Really, well why would they say that when most of the pakistani there are from FATA, NWFP and Balo, since they have relational ties in Afghanistan.
                  I really don't believe that last statement.

                  ------------------
                  CROIRE A L'INCROYABLE
                  You can't fix stupid. So might as well troll them!

                  Comment


                    #10
                    CM. you don’t have to believe anything. There are thousands of foreigners being trained and are fighting in the army of Talibans – from China to Yemen, Saudi Arabia to England. Checkout yesterday’s NYTimes, and read for yourself. Afghans themselves are quoted as referring to Pakistanis as “Punjabis”, and if you go and talk to any Afghan (outside of Taliban), they will tell you what they think of Pakistan.
                    http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/16/world/16TALI.html

                    let me quote it from the article:

                    >>>>> But villagers a quarter-mile away said there were lots of Arabs in Qargagh, along with other fighters: Turks, Africans, Tajiks and, of course, "Punjabis" — the local term for Pakistanis. The foreigners had been there for a long time, they said.<<<<


                    check this out for yourself.

                    Additionally, check out the long article that I referred to earlier.
                    http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/16/world/16AFGH.html

                    Comment


                      #11
                      Hey could you tell what page these quote are exactly on, as i can't find them.
                      And what these NYT writers went to the afghan people??
                      Yeah right!!!

                      ------------------
                      CROIRE A L'INCROYABLE
                      You can't fix stupid. So might as well troll them!

                      Comment


                        #12
                        CM..check out the first link http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/16/world/16TALI.html
                        Paragraph 6.

                        And for your info. NYTimes goes everywhere, it is not your bloody Nawa-e-Waqt.

                        Comment


                          #13
                          Afghans refer to Pakistanis fighting there as Punjabis.

                          Since CM already told you that most of the fighters are NWFP and Bola and some are from Punjab also.

                          So now here that you bring in the racial slinger, are you telling me that calling someone Punjabi is a bad thing? Or in other words are you saying that Punjabis are not proud of their heritage and by calling them so you are insulting them?

                          Hahaha! You must be kidding me right?

                          Well tell me what did you refer to Taliban as? Since you knew that majority of them are Pashtuns (Pathans).

                          Do you want me to pull up that thread and show how full of sh*t you are?

                          CM. you don’t have to believe anything. There are thousands of foreigners being trained and are fighting in the army of Talibans – from China to Yemen, Saudi Arabia to England. Checkout yesterday’s NYTimes, and read for yourself. Afghans themselves are quoted as referring to Pakistanis as “Punjabis”, and if you go and talk to any Afghan (outside of Taliban), they will tell you what they think of Pakistan.

                          Yemenis are Yemenis and Saudis are Saudis. And if calling someone Punjabi is a bad thing for you, then it is your problem because your stating that it is degrading in some sort of way.

                          Can some Punjabi ask this guy that what is the problem with calling some Pakistani a Punjabi if there is any?



                          ------------------
                          *We are the Taleban-Resistance is Futile*
                          YB Osama Bin Junior.

                          Comment


                            #14
                            Youngerbrat. I never said that calling someone Punjabi is an insult. Don’t you find it ironic that all Pakistanis fighting in Afghanistan are being referred to as Punjabis? I don’t know where you live, but in the rest of the world, when one leave one’s territorial borders, one is referred to as the citizen of one’s country. I don’t think a Swiss will refer to a Pakistani as Punjabi or a Balooch. Call someone from Qatif a Najrani, and find out the size of their club. Ask me where Qatif is.

                            Comment


                              #15
                              Originally posted by NYAhmadi:
                              Youngerbrat. I never said that calling someone Punjabi is an insult. Don’t you find it ironic that all Pakistanis fighting in Afghanistan are being referred to as Punjabis? I don’t know where you live, but in the rest of the world, when one leave one’s territorial borders, one is referred to as the citizen of one’s country.

                              Baseless and false propaganda by the enemies of Islam! All just to bring in the evil of nationalism within Muslim brethren. Afghanistan’s Islamic government does not believe in the evil of nationalism and it is well known that they welcome Mujahideens from all over the Islamic world without any national bias. There is no room for such baseless accusations.


                              Comment

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