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atimes.com
India/Pakistan
Musharraf strengthens grip on nukes, power
STRATFOR.COM's
Global Intelligence Update
Dec 7, 2000
Summary
Pakistan's National Command Authority held its second meeting on
November 27, during which Islamabad decided to consolidate its nuclear
weapons management under the control of General Pervez Musharraf. The
decision deters military adventurism by Pakistan's archrival, India. The
consolidation also puts Musharraf in a position of strength in terms of
international bargaining and fighting off his enemies within Pakistan.
Analysis
Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) held its second meeting in
Rawalpindi on November 27 at the Strategic Plans Division, The Nation
reported. Pakistan's Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf, who leads
the NCA, chaired the meeting. During this last session, the NCA made
decisions to consolidate its nuclear weapons management system.
Musharraf is reforming Pakistan's nuclear sector and command system as a
strategic deterrent to India. He wants to consolidate his power in the
country, which is driven by different and antagonistic forces. Musharraf
needs the added strength in order to negotiate with the international
community - and within his own country.
The NCA was established in February 2000 to create command and control
mechanisms for Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile systems. It is
responsible for policy formulation, employment and development control
over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. Besides
Musharraf, the NCA includes foreign affairs, defense and interior
ministers, chiefs of all military services and heads of strategic
organizations.
After the meeting, the Pakistani government released a statement saying,
"The meeting reviewed the strategic and security environment facing
Pakistan and took important decisions on nuclear policy matters that
included, among others, strategic threat perception, restructuring of
the strategic organizations and export control mechanisms," according to
the November 28 Times of India.
Pakistan has no intention of abandoning its nuclear program, at least in
the near future; when a country enhances its nuclear weapons command and
control system, it generally reveals the opposite. For Islamabad,
nuclear weapons provide a final trump card in a possible conflict with
its much bigger rival, India.
India has Pakistan outmanned and outgunned, both overall and in
conventional forces and arms. There are approximately 980,000 active
Indian troops and another 800,000 in reserve. In comparison, Pakistan
has an estimated 562,000 active soldiers and 500,000 reservists. India
boasts 3,600 tanks to Pakistan's 2,200, and the Indian air force
maintains 890 fighting aircraft as compared to Pakistan's 620.
Pakistan has worked hard to gain the advantage in number of conventional
arms. Once Pakistan achieves some success, India once again upsets
Pakistan's hard-earned advantage. For example, this year has witnessed
the beginning of production of Pakistan's new major battle tank,
Al-Khalid. This 46 ton, three-man tank was built with Chinese help and
has a maximum speed of 40 mph. With a cruising range of 250 miles, it is
indeed superior to India's Arjun tank. But India signed a US$3 billion
package with Russia last month, and New Delhi is building and will
receive 310 of Russia's newest major battle tanks, the T-90s, which beat
Al-Khalid in every parameter. The same is true of combat aircraft and
naval ships.
Pakistan maintains a first-strike option in its nuclear doctrine. With
India outgunning Pakistan's conventional forces at every turn, the
accepted use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack
sends a message to New Delhi that, despite its larger military, Pakistan
is not incapable of defending itself.
Pakistan also had a nuclear advantage because its chief of the army
staff had been in charge of nuclear planning and deployment, even when
there was a civilian head of government. Last month, India hoped to
catch up with Pakistan on the issue of nuclear planning and management
by introducing a new high command structure.
Islamabad's response was to integrate all research, design, production,
planning and deployment of nuclear weapons in the NCA under Musharraf's
control, once again positioning itself above its archrival. India still
does not have a centralized nuclear authority body such as Pakistan's
NCA, and its political and military branches of power are not linked
together with regard to nuclear weapons. India's civilian government
executes full control over design, research and production of nuclear
weapons, while the Indian military is in charge of operational control
over nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's government is concerned with not only nuclear but also
missile capability. Musharraf also has established a Strategic Force
Command led by a serving army general responsible for deployment of
strategic missiles. Pakistan possesses two versions of a medium-range
nuclear-capable missile called Ghauri. Its Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-11 also
belong to the same class of missiles. The existing version of the Ghauri
missile is operational and has a range of 800 to 1,200 miles; the
ability to carry nuclear, biological and chemical warheads; and the
ability to be launched from land or air. The missile is said to be
equipped with an extremely accurate guidance system.
By all these parameters, the Ghauri is superior to India's medium-range
missile Prithvi. It means Pakistan's missile-launching abilities are
higher than those of India. Pakistan also may have tested a new version
of the Ghauri with a range of up to 1,800 miles that amounts to a new
class of missile - not medium range, but the so-called long-range
missiles. To counter Pakistan's temporary superiority, India is actively
working in two directions: first, to improve characteristics and range
of its medium-range missiles, and second, to create its first
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of 5,000 to 8,000
miles.
By further integrating and strengthening its nuclear command system
under the NCA, Pakistan is trying to better position itself for future
challenges in the region. The first test is probable talks with India,
in which Pakistan would be able to talk from a position of strength, not
weakness. The NCA will guard the work of organizations such as the Khan
Research Laboratories (KRL) led by Dr Qadeer Khan, who is considered the
mastermind of Pakistan's nuclear program, the National Development
Complex (NDC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Thus,
Musharraf is reining in the very strong, nearly autonomous civilian
nuclear research and development agencies. This will add to
consolidation of his authority in the country as a whole and in the
nuclear field in particular.
Musharraf has made himself the sole caretaker for the country's nuclear
arsenal. This will make it much more difficult for someone else to use
Pakistan's nuclear weapons and strategic missiles without Musharraf's
authorization. He faces the threat of some hardline factions within the
military, Inter-Service Intelligence and radical Islamic circles whose
influence in the country grows. Any of these internal threats may try to
gain access to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal - either for striking India
or "the enemies of Islam".
Musharraf also may have more authority and negotiation power while
dealing with the United States and other Western powers. He needs it for
discussing the nuclear proliferation problem and Pakistan's adherence,
or non-adherence, to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Musharraf
can demonstrate the international community should not worry about
Pakistan's non-adherence to CTBT because its nuclear weapons are now
under complete control of secular- and reform-minded Musharraf.
Restructuring export control mechanisms through the NCA also means
Musharraf is strengthening his control over the export of fissile
materials and nuclear technology. In addition to Musharraf taking this
important field under his tight control, the move is also an attempt to
reverse the worsening of Pakistan-US relations. It is meant to send a
positive signal to America that Pakistan is making an effort to tighten
its export controls on nuclear materials and technology.
Putting everything under Musharraf's control does give him better
leverage both inside and outside the country. But it also gives him
little flexibility to place the responsibility on others if he is in a
tight spot and blamed for Pakistan's current and likely future failures.
Also, it remains to be seen whether this full control over Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal will be transferred from Musharraf as the top leader of
Pakistan to the country's civilian supreme authorities after elections
are held next year. In the status of the NCA, there is no wording on the
role of the Pakistani prime minister or other top civilian authority as
a future head of the NCA. Also, if another military ruler replaces
Musharraf, there is no guarantee his successor would pursue the same
nuclear policy.
Nevertheless, integrating all decision-making power over nuclear weapons
within the NCA represents the opportunity to gain full control over
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Provided the military does not rebel, a
future civilian government of the country would have a chance to assert
its authority over the whole nuclear complex, since the NCA is not a
military body.
------------------
atimes.com
India/Pakistan
Musharraf strengthens grip on nukes, power
STRATFOR.COM's
Global Intelligence Update
Dec 7, 2000
Summary
Pakistan's National Command Authority held its second meeting on
November 27, during which Islamabad decided to consolidate its nuclear
weapons management under the control of General Pervez Musharraf. The
decision deters military adventurism by Pakistan's archrival, India. The
consolidation also puts Musharraf in a position of strength in terms of
international bargaining and fighting off his enemies within Pakistan.
Analysis
Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) held its second meeting in
Rawalpindi on November 27 at the Strategic Plans Division, The Nation
reported. Pakistan's Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf, who leads
the NCA, chaired the meeting. During this last session, the NCA made
decisions to consolidate its nuclear weapons management system.
Musharraf is reforming Pakistan's nuclear sector and command system as a
strategic deterrent to India. He wants to consolidate his power in the
country, which is driven by different and antagonistic forces. Musharraf
needs the added strength in order to negotiate with the international
community - and within his own country.
The NCA was established in February 2000 to create command and control
mechanisms for Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile systems. It is
responsible for policy formulation, employment and development control
over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. Besides
Musharraf, the NCA includes foreign affairs, defense and interior
ministers, chiefs of all military services and heads of strategic
organizations.
After the meeting, the Pakistani government released a statement saying,
"The meeting reviewed the strategic and security environment facing
Pakistan and took important decisions on nuclear policy matters that
included, among others, strategic threat perception, restructuring of
the strategic organizations and export control mechanisms," according to
the November 28 Times of India.
Pakistan has no intention of abandoning its nuclear program, at least in
the near future; when a country enhances its nuclear weapons command and
control system, it generally reveals the opposite. For Islamabad,
nuclear weapons provide a final trump card in a possible conflict with
its much bigger rival, India.
India has Pakistan outmanned and outgunned, both overall and in
conventional forces and arms. There are approximately 980,000 active
Indian troops and another 800,000 in reserve. In comparison, Pakistan
has an estimated 562,000 active soldiers and 500,000 reservists. India
boasts 3,600 tanks to Pakistan's 2,200, and the Indian air force
maintains 890 fighting aircraft as compared to Pakistan's 620.
Pakistan has worked hard to gain the advantage in number of conventional
arms. Once Pakistan achieves some success, India once again upsets
Pakistan's hard-earned advantage. For example, this year has witnessed
the beginning of production of Pakistan's new major battle tank,
Al-Khalid. This 46 ton, three-man tank was built with Chinese help and
has a maximum speed of 40 mph. With a cruising range of 250 miles, it is
indeed superior to India's Arjun tank. But India signed a US$3 billion
package with Russia last month, and New Delhi is building and will
receive 310 of Russia's newest major battle tanks, the T-90s, which beat
Al-Khalid in every parameter. The same is true of combat aircraft and
naval ships.
Pakistan maintains a first-strike option in its nuclear doctrine. With
India outgunning Pakistan's conventional forces at every turn, the
accepted use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack
sends a message to New Delhi that, despite its larger military, Pakistan
is not incapable of defending itself.
Pakistan also had a nuclear advantage because its chief of the army
staff had been in charge of nuclear planning and deployment, even when
there was a civilian head of government. Last month, India hoped to
catch up with Pakistan on the issue of nuclear planning and management
by introducing a new high command structure.
Islamabad's response was to integrate all research, design, production,
planning and deployment of nuclear weapons in the NCA under Musharraf's
control, once again positioning itself above its archrival. India still
does not have a centralized nuclear authority body such as Pakistan's
NCA, and its political and military branches of power are not linked
together with regard to nuclear weapons. India's civilian government
executes full control over design, research and production of nuclear
weapons, while the Indian military is in charge of operational control
over nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's government is concerned with not only nuclear but also
missile capability. Musharraf also has established a Strategic Force
Command led by a serving army general responsible for deployment of
strategic missiles. Pakistan possesses two versions of a medium-range
nuclear-capable missile called Ghauri. Its Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-11 also
belong to the same class of missiles. The existing version of the Ghauri
missile is operational and has a range of 800 to 1,200 miles; the
ability to carry nuclear, biological and chemical warheads; and the
ability to be launched from land or air. The missile is said to be
equipped with an extremely accurate guidance system.
By all these parameters, the Ghauri is superior to India's medium-range
missile Prithvi. It means Pakistan's missile-launching abilities are
higher than those of India. Pakistan also may have tested a new version
of the Ghauri with a range of up to 1,800 miles that amounts to a new
class of missile - not medium range, but the so-called long-range
missiles. To counter Pakistan's temporary superiority, India is actively
working in two directions: first, to improve characteristics and range
of its medium-range missiles, and second, to create its first
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of 5,000 to 8,000
miles.
By further integrating and strengthening its nuclear command system
under the NCA, Pakistan is trying to better position itself for future
challenges in the region. The first test is probable talks with India,
in which Pakistan would be able to talk from a position of strength, not
weakness. The NCA will guard the work of organizations such as the Khan
Research Laboratories (KRL) led by Dr Qadeer Khan, who is considered the
mastermind of Pakistan's nuclear program, the National Development
Complex (NDC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Thus,
Musharraf is reining in the very strong, nearly autonomous civilian
nuclear research and development agencies. This will add to
consolidation of his authority in the country as a whole and in the
nuclear field in particular.
Musharraf has made himself the sole caretaker for the country's nuclear
arsenal. This will make it much more difficult for someone else to use
Pakistan's nuclear weapons and strategic missiles without Musharraf's
authorization. He faces the threat of some hardline factions within the
military, Inter-Service Intelligence and radical Islamic circles whose
influence in the country grows. Any of these internal threats may try to
gain access to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal - either for striking India
or "the enemies of Islam".
Musharraf also may have more authority and negotiation power while
dealing with the United States and other Western powers. He needs it for
discussing the nuclear proliferation problem and Pakistan's adherence,
or non-adherence, to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Musharraf
can demonstrate the international community should not worry about
Pakistan's non-adherence to CTBT because its nuclear weapons are now
under complete control of secular- and reform-minded Musharraf.
Restructuring export control mechanisms through the NCA also means
Musharraf is strengthening his control over the export of fissile
materials and nuclear technology. In addition to Musharraf taking this
important field under his tight control, the move is also an attempt to
reverse the worsening of Pakistan-US relations. It is meant to send a
positive signal to America that Pakistan is making an effort to tighten
its export controls on nuclear materials and technology.
Putting everything under Musharraf's control does give him better
leverage both inside and outside the country. But it also gives him
little flexibility to place the responsibility on others if he is in a
tight spot and blamed for Pakistan's current and likely future failures.
Also, it remains to be seen whether this full control over Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal will be transferred from Musharraf as the top leader of
Pakistan to the country's civilian supreme authorities after elections
are held next year. In the status of the NCA, there is no wording on the
role of the Pakistani prime minister or other top civilian authority as
a future head of the NCA. Also, if another military ruler replaces
Musharraf, there is no guarantee his successor would pursue the same
nuclear policy.
Nevertheless, integrating all decision-making power over nuclear weapons
within the NCA represents the opportunity to gain full control over
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Provided the military does not rebel, a
future civilian government of the country would have a chance to assert
its authority over the whole nuclear complex, since the NCA is not a
military body.
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