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    Revealed: Official history of 1965 war

    ummm interesting...well iw as just readin this ..thought Id share it wid u guys!!!

    Revealed: Official history of 1965 war

    By Manoj Joshi


    NEW DELHI: Thirty-five years ago on September 6, the Indian Army crossed the Wagah border at
    4 a.m. and moved towards Lahore. The attack came as the culmination of a year that first saw
    Pakistan testing the Indian will in Kutch, then launching a guerrilla invasion of the Kashmir Valley. On
    September 1, 1965, the Pakistan Army entered the fray because the Indian counter-infiltration
    operation was threatening to close in on Muzaffarabad. The September 6 attack touched off the
    second Indo-Pakistan war.

    The Times of India has acquired a copy of the official history of the 1965 war, finalised by the
    defence ministry in 1992 after years of research, but suppressed ever since.

    Contemporary accounts, generated by a jingoistic press, saw the war as a spectacular victory on
    almost every front. But the truth -- which cannot be hidden despite the best efforts of the official
    historians -- is that the war was, in the words of one its most distinguished commanders, Lt. Gen.
    Harbakhsh Singh, "a catalogue of lost victories".

    There was no strategic plan. As the official history points out, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was in the
    dark about the Army's plan to launch a surprise attack towards Lahore and Sialkot. Instead of
    launching pre-emptive strikes the IAF was caught unawares by a Pakistan Air Force attack on its
    bases in the evening of September 6. The IAF retaliated a day later.

    The official history says that there was no plan to capture Lahore but is silent on why three divisions
    were deployed for the Ichogil Canal? If the Indian plan was to defeat Pakistan through attrition by
    shallow attacks, it nearly came a cropper when Pakistan's I Armoured Division blasted its way into
    Khem Karan and was poised to capture Amritsar and the bridge on the Beas to Jalandhar.

    Poor leadership manifested itself from the top to bottom. According to the official history, on
    September 10, as Pakistani armour tried to break the defences of Khem Karan, Gen. J.N. Chaudhuri
    rushed to Ambala to persuade Lt. Gen. Singh to withdraw behind the Beas. But Singh stood his
    ground and by the end of the day, Pakistan's I Armoured Division lay disintegrated.

    "After the initial Indian reverses suffered in Khem Karan, an Indian Army top brass (emphasis added)
    was so panicked that he thought of withdrawing the Indian forces behind the Beas, but the Army
    commander overruled it," says the official history.

    It glosses over many similar episodes in the war. As Lt. Gen. Singh recounts in his War Despatches,
    the commander of the 54 Brigade failed to exploit Lt. Col. Hayde and his 3 Jat's success in capturing
    Batapur, in the outskirts of Lahore across the Ichogil Canal, by 11.30 a.m. on September 6.

    In fact, by 1 p.m., the Division Commander, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, had in a signal declared that
    Pakistani air attacks had taken so heavy a toll that no further offensive action was possible.

    Recounting the meeting he had with Prasad at Atari an hour later, Lt. Gen. Singh notes: "I was
    astonished by his personal appearance. He seemed to be drained of will or vision. His attitude was
    passively negative and there was the unmistakable air of the defeatist around him." Lt. Gen. Singh
    decided to replace Prasad. Later, the commander of the 38 Brigade, another formation under the
    Division, was also removed.

    The official history lists the Indian Army's 1st Armoured Division's great thrust towards Sialkot and
    Lt. Col. A.B. Tarapore -- who was posthumously awarded the Paramvir Chakra -- and his Puna
    Horse's bravery in Phillora. However, the report does not recount how overcautious Indian
    commanders threw away certain victory.

    The attack plan was faulty in that instead of concentrating on one solid punch, the Division divided
    itself into two prongs, one consisting of a Lorried infantry Brigade and the other of the 1st Armoured
    Brigade. It took off early on September 8, but, as Singh notes, "the brisk outburst soon limped to a
    dead halt". Under fire from Pakistani tanks at a place called Tharaoh, the Brigade commander
    withdrew his spearhead. By the time the advance resumed, the momentum had been lost. The story of
    Lahore was repeated.

    India's great victory in this war, in the battle of Asal Uttar, was actually inadvertent and born as much
    from Pakistani incompetence as from the jawan's tenacity in defence. A third thrust towards the
    Ichogil canal had been planned from the Khem Karan area south of Amritsar as well. This was the
    job of the IV Mountain Division. But instead of moving forward, the Division suddenly encountered a
    counter-thrust led by Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division.

    The infantry units broke up before the assault. The official history notes the withdrawal of the
    commanding officer and a company of the 9 J&K Rifles, but does not point out that he did so without
    permission.

    Fortunately, the divisional commander remained calm. With the help of Brigadier Theograj's 2nd
    Independent Armoured Brigade, he deployed his forces in a horseshoe around the village of Asal
    Uttar to check the Pakistani advance. The Pakistani plan was ambitious and had it succeeded, it
    would have cut off all of Punjab west of the Beas.

    The biggest blunder of the war was the Indian decision to accept a ceasefire when it did on
    September 22. At least here the official history throws more light than has been available in accounts
    till now. "...Towards the end of the war, the Indian Prime Minister enquired from Gen. J.N. Chaudhuri
    whether India could win a spectacular victory if the war was prolonged for some days. The general
    replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and there had been considerable
    tank losses also. But later it was found that at the time of the ceasefire, only about 14 per cent of
    India's frontline ammunition had been fired and the number of tanks still held by India was twice the
    number Pakistan had." This was at a time when Pakistan had expended some 80 per cent of its
    ammunition. By mid-September, says a historian not unfriendly to Pakistan, 155 mm ammunition was
    rationed to five shells per day per gun.

    If the victory was lost, what saved the day? Ultimately, the bravery and grit of the jawans and the
    junior commanders. In the words of military historian Maj. Gen. D.K.Palit, "their courage and
    fortitude... turned a timid and sterile plan in our favour."

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    A bend in da road is not da end of da road

    #2
    Sorry buddy but this was posted around 4 days ago by mailik.
    Check the world politics section for the whole thread for arguing

    ------------------
    CROIRE A L'INCROYABLE
    You can't fix stupid. So might as well troll them!

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      #3
      Thanx man..i didnt know..i'll chk dat out

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      A bend in da road is not da end of da road

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