From www.stratfor.com
Was There More to the Clinton-Sharif Talks?
1930 GMT, 990709
U.S. President Bill Clinton met in Washington on July 4 with Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to discuss the continuing conflict in the disputed Kashmir region. The
meeting, called by Sharif, concluded with the Pakistani leader agreeing to call for the
withdrawal of Moslem fundamentalist guerrillas from positions in the Indian controlled
section of the disputed Kashmir region. Sharif’s agreement appears to be just the
capitulation he came to Washington in hopes of avoiding. However, examining the issues
in Pakistan as well as events in neighboring Afghanistan suggest that there may be more
to the deal than appears on the surface.
Sharif approved the dispatch of Pakistani backed guerrillas – and possibly Pakistani troops –
to the Indian side of Kashmir’s Line of Control (LoC), in part, as a means of winning
domestic support from Pakistan’s military and Moslem fundamentalists and, in part, in
hopes of pushing the international community to intervene in the dispute. While the
infiltrators scored some initial successes, the Indian military has been making slow but
steady progress in driving out the guerrillas. Meanwhile, the international community,
worried about a possible escalation of the conflict between these two newest nuclear
powers, almost universally blamed Pakistan for the incursion and refused to become
involved in the dispute. Sharif’s options are to escalate the conflict – further worsening
Pakistan’s international isolation and risking a much more substantial loss, or withdrawing
the forces – risking a domestic outcry and possibly his career.
Neither option is attractive, and having been soundly rebuffed when he went to Beijing for
support, Sharif turned to the U.S. in a last ditch effort to salvage some semblance of victory
from his losing venture. Yet he came away from the U.S. talks with apparently very little.
He has to withdraw the forces from Kashmir. What did he seek and receive in return? As
even Sharif knew the U.S. was neither going to politically nor militarily support a Moslem
fundamentalist movement in waging war in Kashmir – reportedly linked to the Afghan
Taleban militia and to Osama bin Laden. Sharif could only have sought U.S. support in
internationalizing the diplomatic dispute over Kashmir. He wants the U.S. to push,
perhaps in the UN Security Council, for internationally mediated negotiations between
India and Pakistan on Kashmir. This he can declare domestically as a victory, arguing that
the incursion and his diplomatic initiative put Kashmir on the international agenda.
That is fine for Sharif, but besides the temporary decrease in tensions in South Asia, what
does the U.S. get in return? After all, it is far from clear that either side planned or plans to
escalate the conflict to full scale war, or that a full scale war would degenerate into a
nuclear exchange. What did the U.S. ask for?
Washington has a major interest in the region, in regards to which Pakistan might be able
to offer assistance. The U.S. wants Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden’s head on a platter – or
at very least on his shoulders in a U.S. prison. Bin Laden is reportedly in Afghanistan,
under the protection and care of the Taleban militia. The Taleban, in turn, owe their control
of some 80 percent of Afghanistan to Pakistan, which helped found and nurture them,
supports them, and reportedly even fights alongside them.
As Sharif headed back to Pakistan, prepared to call for the withdrawal of infiltrators from
Indian-controlled Kashmir, the U.S. announced July 6 it was clamping new sanctions on
the Taleban, including a freeze on Taleban assets in the U.S. and a ban on trade with the
Taleban. Taleban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar condemned the sanctions, charging July
7 that the U.S. "has taken a vindictive action because of mutual differences and its
malicious designs against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." On July 8, chief Taleban
spokesman Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil insisted the Taleban would survive the sanctions
and charged the international community with looking for an excuse to assail the Taleban.
However, Mutawakil also acknowledged that bin Laden is in Afghanistan, under the
protection and supervision of a special Taleban security detail. Additionally, Mutawakil
stated the Taleban’s willingness to discuss bin Laden. "We are ready to hold talks with
the U.S. on Osama. We want to resolve the issue, but no one is willing to listen to us," he
told the Pakistan based Afghan Islamic Press.
So, did the looming threat of sanctions terrify the Taleban into willingness to discuss bin
Laden? Not likely. The Taleban have little to lose, with heroin revenues already subject to
"sanctions" and the majority of their legal trade going through Pakistan. The sanctions are
meaningless if the Pakistanis do not abide by them – and that may just be the point. Sharif
may have agreed to pressure the Taleban on the bin Laden issue in return for the U.S.
pressuring India and the UN on Kashmir. The sanctions are both a lever and political cover
for the Pakistani government and the Taleban handing over bin Laden. Whether the U.S.
sweetened the deal with the possibility of recognizing the Taleban is unclear, though it has
been suggested as a possibility in the past. U.S. companies are eager to run a pipeline
from Central Asia through western Afghanistan, and with competition for Central Asia
heating up between the U.S., Russia, and Iran, this option may be worth recognizing the
Taleban.
This is all hypothetical, as no variation of this potential deal has been announced or
leaked. In fact, when asked if the Pakistan talks and the Taleban sanctions were linked,
State Department spokesman James Foley said, "No." Still, Sharif would not withdraw
forces from Kashmir for nothing – it would be political suicide. And the Taleban have no
reason to fear sanctions – but suddenly they are willing to talk. An interesting coincidence,
if that is all it is.
Was There More to the Clinton-Sharif Talks?
1930 GMT, 990709
U.S. President Bill Clinton met in Washington on July 4 with Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to discuss the continuing conflict in the disputed Kashmir region. The
meeting, called by Sharif, concluded with the Pakistani leader agreeing to call for the
withdrawal of Moslem fundamentalist guerrillas from positions in the Indian controlled
section of the disputed Kashmir region. Sharif’s agreement appears to be just the
capitulation he came to Washington in hopes of avoiding. However, examining the issues
in Pakistan as well as events in neighboring Afghanistan suggest that there may be more
to the deal than appears on the surface.
Sharif approved the dispatch of Pakistani backed guerrillas – and possibly Pakistani troops –
to the Indian side of Kashmir’s Line of Control (LoC), in part, as a means of winning
domestic support from Pakistan’s military and Moslem fundamentalists and, in part, in
hopes of pushing the international community to intervene in the dispute. While the
infiltrators scored some initial successes, the Indian military has been making slow but
steady progress in driving out the guerrillas. Meanwhile, the international community,
worried about a possible escalation of the conflict between these two newest nuclear
powers, almost universally blamed Pakistan for the incursion and refused to become
involved in the dispute. Sharif’s options are to escalate the conflict – further worsening
Pakistan’s international isolation and risking a much more substantial loss, or withdrawing
the forces – risking a domestic outcry and possibly his career.
Neither option is attractive, and having been soundly rebuffed when he went to Beijing for
support, Sharif turned to the U.S. in a last ditch effort to salvage some semblance of victory
from his losing venture. Yet he came away from the U.S. talks with apparently very little.
He has to withdraw the forces from Kashmir. What did he seek and receive in return? As
even Sharif knew the U.S. was neither going to politically nor militarily support a Moslem
fundamentalist movement in waging war in Kashmir – reportedly linked to the Afghan
Taleban militia and to Osama bin Laden. Sharif could only have sought U.S. support in
internationalizing the diplomatic dispute over Kashmir. He wants the U.S. to push,
perhaps in the UN Security Council, for internationally mediated negotiations between
India and Pakistan on Kashmir. This he can declare domestically as a victory, arguing that
the incursion and his diplomatic initiative put Kashmir on the international agenda.
That is fine for Sharif, but besides the temporary decrease in tensions in South Asia, what
does the U.S. get in return? After all, it is far from clear that either side planned or plans to
escalate the conflict to full scale war, or that a full scale war would degenerate into a
nuclear exchange. What did the U.S. ask for?
Washington has a major interest in the region, in regards to which Pakistan might be able
to offer assistance. The U.S. wants Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden’s head on a platter – or
at very least on his shoulders in a U.S. prison. Bin Laden is reportedly in Afghanistan,
under the protection and care of the Taleban militia. The Taleban, in turn, owe their control
of some 80 percent of Afghanistan to Pakistan, which helped found and nurture them,
supports them, and reportedly even fights alongside them.
As Sharif headed back to Pakistan, prepared to call for the withdrawal of infiltrators from
Indian-controlled Kashmir, the U.S. announced July 6 it was clamping new sanctions on
the Taleban, including a freeze on Taleban assets in the U.S. and a ban on trade with the
Taleban. Taleban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar condemned the sanctions, charging July
7 that the U.S. "has taken a vindictive action because of mutual differences and its
malicious designs against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." On July 8, chief Taleban
spokesman Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil insisted the Taleban would survive the sanctions
and charged the international community with looking for an excuse to assail the Taleban.
However, Mutawakil also acknowledged that bin Laden is in Afghanistan, under the
protection and supervision of a special Taleban security detail. Additionally, Mutawakil
stated the Taleban’s willingness to discuss bin Laden. "We are ready to hold talks with
the U.S. on Osama. We want to resolve the issue, but no one is willing to listen to us," he
told the Pakistan based Afghan Islamic Press.
So, did the looming threat of sanctions terrify the Taleban into willingness to discuss bin
Laden? Not likely. The Taleban have little to lose, with heroin revenues already subject to
"sanctions" and the majority of their legal trade going through Pakistan. The sanctions are
meaningless if the Pakistanis do not abide by them – and that may just be the point. Sharif
may have agreed to pressure the Taleban on the bin Laden issue in return for the U.S.
pressuring India and the UN on Kashmir. The sanctions are both a lever and political cover
for the Pakistani government and the Taleban handing over bin Laden. Whether the U.S.
sweetened the deal with the possibility of recognizing the Taleban is unclear, though it has
been suggested as a possibility in the past. U.S. companies are eager to run a pipeline
from Central Asia through western Afghanistan, and with competition for Central Asia
heating up between the U.S., Russia, and Iran, this option may be worth recognizing the
Taleban.
This is all hypothetical, as no variation of this potential deal has been announced or
leaked. In fact, when asked if the Pakistan talks and the Taleban sanctions were linked,
State Department spokesman James Foley said, "No." Still, Sharif would not withdraw
forces from Kashmir for nothing – it would be political suicide. And the Taleban have no
reason to fear sanctions – but suddenly they are willing to talk. An interesting coincidence,
if that is all it is.